The long-term impact of algorithmic decision making is shaped by the dynamics between the deployed decision rule and individuals' response. Focusing on settings where each individual desires a positive classication-including many important applications such as hiring and school admissions, we study a dynamic learning setting where individuals invest in a positive outcome based on their group's expected gain and the decision rule is updated to maximize institutional benet. By characterizing the equilibria of these dynamics, we show that natural challenges to desirable long-term outcomes arise due to heterogeneity across groups and the lack of realizability. We consider two interventions, decoupling the decision rule by group and subsidizing the cost of investment. We show that decoupling achieves optimal outcomes in the realizable case but has discrepant eects that may depend on the initial conditions otherwise. In contrast, subsidizing the cost of investment is shown to create better equilibria for the disadvantaged group even in the absence of realizability.
On one hand, deployed decision making models are updated periodically to assure high performance on the target distribution. On the other hand, deployed models can reshape the underlying populations thus biasing how the model is updated in the future. This complex interplay between algorithmic decisions, individual-level responses, and exogeneous societal forces can lead to pernicious long term eects that reinforce or even exacerbate existing social injustices [13, 44] . Harmful feedback loops have been observed in automated decision making in several contexts including recommendation systems [7, 11, 38] , predictive policing [18] , admission decisions [5, 35] , and credit markets [1, 20] . These examples underscore the need to better understand the dynamics of algorithmic decision making, in order to align decisions made about people with desirable long-term societal outcomes.
Automated decision-making algorithms rely on observable features to predict some variable of interest. In a setting such as hiring, decision making models assess features such as scores on standardized tests, resume, and recommendation letters, to identify individuals that are qualied for the job. However, equally qualied people from dierent demographic groups tend to have dierent features, due to implicit societal biases (e.g., letter writers describe competent men and women dierently), gaps in resources (e.g., auent students can aord dierent extra-curriculars) and even distinct tendencies in self-description (e.g., gender can be inferred from biographies [16] ). Therefore, a model's ability to identify qualied individuals can widely vary across dierent groups.
The deployed model's ability to identify qualied members of a group aects an individual's incentive to invest in their qualication. This is because one's decision to acquire qualication-not observed directly by the algorithm-comes at a cost. Moreover, individuals that are identied by the model as qualied (whether or not they are truly qualied) receive a reward. Consequently, people invest in acquiring qualications only when their expected reward from the assessment model beats the investment cost.
Rational individuals are aware that upon investing they would develop features that are similar to those of qualied individuals in their group, so they gauge their own expected reward from investing by the observed rewards of their group. 1 If qualied people from one group are not duly identied and rewarded, fewer people from that group are incentivized to invest in qualications in the future. This reduces the overall fraction of qualied people in that group, or the qualication rate. As the assessment model is updated to maximize overall institutional prot on the new population distribution, it may perform even more poorly on qualied individuals from a group with relatively low qualication rate, further reducing the group's incentive to invest.
To understand and mitigate the challenges to long-term welfare and fairness posed by such dynamics, we propose a formal model of sequential learning and decision-making where at each round a new batch of individuals rationally decide whether to invest in acquiring qualication and the institution updates its assessment rule (a classier) for assessing and thus rewarding individuals. We study the long-term behavior of these dynamics by characterizing their equilibria and comparing these equilibria based on several metrics of social desirability. Our model can be seen as an extension of Coate and Loury [10] 's widely cited work to explicitly address heterogeneity in observed features across groups. While Coate and Loury [10] 's model focuses on a single-dimensional feature space, i.e., scores, and assessment rules that act as thresholds on the score, our model considers general, possibly high-dimensional, feature spaces and arbitrary assessment rules, which are typical in high-stakes domains such as hiring and admissions.
We nd that two major obstacles to obtaining desirable long-term outcomes are heterogeneity across groups and lack of realizability within a group. Realizability-the existence of a (near) perfect way to assess qualications of individuals from visible features-leads to equilibria that are (near) optimal on several metrics, such as the resulting qualication rates, their uniformity across groups, and the institution's utility. We study (near) realizability and the lack thereof in Sections 3 and 5 respectively. Heterogeneity across groups, i.e., lack of a single assessment rule that perfectly assesses individuals from all groups, necessitates tradeos in the quality of equilibria across dierent groups. We study heterogeneity, as well as interventions for mitigating its negative eects, in Section 4. In Section 6, we empirically study a more challenging setting where the groups are heterogeneous as well as highly non-realizable, via simulations with a FICO credit score dataset [42] that has been widely used for illustration in the algorithmic fairness literature.
Interventions. To mitigate the aforementioned tradeos, we consider two common interventions: decoupling the decision policy by group and subsidizing the cost of investment, especially when the cost distribution inherently diers by group. Our model of dynamics sheds a dierent light on these interventions, complementary to previous work. We show that decoupling [17] -using group-specic assessment rules-achieves optimal outcomes when the problem is realizable within each group, but can signicantly hurt certain groups when the problem is non-realizable and there exist multiple equilibria after decoupling. In particular, decoupling can hurt a group with low initial qualication rate if the utility-maximizing assessment rule for a single group is more disincentivizing to individuals than a joint assessment rule, thereby reinforcing the status quo and preventing the group from reaching an equilibrium with higher qualication rate.
We also study subsidizing individuals' investment cost (e.g. subsidizing tuition for a top high school), especially when the cost distribution is varied across dierent groups. We nd that these subsidies increase the qualication rate of the disadvantaged group at equilibrium, regardless of realizability. We note that our subsidies, which aect the qualication of individuals directly, are dierent than those studied under strategic manipulation [26] that involve subsidizing individual's cost to manipulate their features Y X A Figure 1 : Causal graph for the individual investment model. The individual intervenes on the node for qualication, Ythis corresponds to do(Y = ))-which then aects the distribution of their features X , depending on the group A.
without changing the underlying qualication (e.g. subsidizing SAT exam preparation without changing the student's qualication for college) and could have adverse eects on disadvantaged groups. Instead, our theoretical ndings resonates with extensive empirical work in economics on the eectiveness of subsidizing opportunities for a disadvantaged group to directly improve their outcomes, such as moving to better neighborhoods to access better educational and environmental resources [8] .
Related work. Our work is related to a rich body of work on algorithmic fairness in dynamic settings [23, 25, 33, 37, 45] , strategic classication [26, 31, 36] , as well as statistical discrimination in economics [2, 3, 10] . We present a detailed discussion of the similarities and dierences in Section 7.
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF ALGORITHMIC DECISION MAKING
In this section we introduce a model of automated decision making with feedback. We rst introduce the notation used throughout the paper and then describe the details of the interactions between individuals and an institution, and the resulting dynamical system.
Notation
We consider an instance space X, where X 2 X denotes the features of an individual that are observable by the institution. We also consider a label space Y = {0, 1} where Y = 1 indicates that an individual has the qualications desired by the institution and Y = 0 otherwise. We denote the set of all protected/group attributes by A where A 2 A denotes an individual's protected attribute. We denote the group proportions by n a B P(A = a) for all a 2 A. Furthermore, we denote the qualication rate in group a 2 A by a B P(Y = 1 | A = a). An individual from group A = a who has acquired label Y = (to become qualied or not) 2 receives features X distributed according to P(X = x | Y = , A = a). This is illustrated in Figure 1 .
We also consider a set of parameters that are used for assessing qualications. We useŶ 2 Y parameterized by 2 to denote the assessed qualication of an individual. We assume thatŶ only depends on the features X , which may or may not contain A or its proxies. In later sections, we will also discuss interventions that allow us to useŶ that explicitly depends on group membership A. We respectively dene the true positive rate and false positive rate of 2 on group a 2 A by TPR a ( ) = P(Ŷ = 1 | Y = 1, A = a), and FPR a ( ) = P(Ŷ = 1 | Y = 0, A = a).
Model Description
Individual's Rational Response. We consider a setting where an individual decides whether to acquire qualications, that is, to invest in obtaining label Y = 1, prior to observing their feature X . The decision to acquire qualication depends on the qualication assessment rule 2 currently implemented by the institution. We will characterize the groups' qualication rates as the best-response to by function br ( ) = ( br a ( )) a 2A . To get label Y = 1 an individual has to pay a cost C > 0. In any group, C is distributed randomly according to the cumulative distribution function (CDF), G (·). 3 After deciding whether to acquire qualications, an individual gets features X and is assessed by . An individual (from any group and regardless of actual qualication) receives a payo of w > 0 if they are assessed to be qualied and payo of 0 otherwise. Therefore, the expected utility an individual from group a receives from acquiring qualication Y = 1 is wP[Ŷ = 1|Y = 1, A = a] C = wTPR a ( ) C whereas the expected utility for not acquiring the qualication is wP[Ŷ = 1|Y = 0, A = a] = wFPR a ( ). Given the qualication assessment parameter 2 , an individual from group a acquires qualication if and only if the benet outweighs the costs, that is
Then each group's qualication rate as a function of a qualication assessment parameter is br a ( ) B P(Y = 1 | A = a) = P(C < w (TPR a ( ) FPR a ( ))) = G (w (TPR a ( ) FPR a ( ))).
Institution's Rational Response
We consider an institution that has to choose a qualication assessment parameter for accepting individuals to maximize its utility. We assume that the institution gains p TP > 0 for accepting a qualied individual and loses c FP > 0 for accepting an unqualied individual. Then the expected utility of the institution for applying parameter is
This illustrates that the utility maximizing parameter is a function of = ( a ) a 2A , i.e., the rate of qualication in each group. We denote this function by br ( ), dened as follows:
To ensure the above object (and the resulting dynamics) are welldened, when multiple parameters achieve the optimal utility we assume that br ( ) is uniquely dened using a xed and welldened tie-breaking function.
Throughout this paper we assume that the institution has exact knowledge of many quantities such as TPR a ( ), FPR a ( ), and n a . In a nutshell, we assume that we have innitely many samples from the underlying distributions. We discuss this further in Section 8, and leave the nite sample version of these results to future work.
Although we choose not to focus on game-theoretical aspects in this work, we note that our model can be thought of as a large game [27] or a game with a continuum of players [41] .
Dynamical System and Equilibria. We are primarily interested in the evolution of qualication rate, , over time. Given a current rate of qualication the assessment parameter used by the institution in the next step is br ( ), which in turn leads to a qualication rate of br ( br ( )) in the next step. Therefore, we dene a dynamical system for a given initial state (0) such that at time t we are in state (t ) = ( (t 1)), where = br br .
We say that the aforementioned dynamical system is at equilibrium if = ( ). Equivalently, we are at an equilibrium if = lim n!1 n ( (0)) is well-dened for some (0), where n is an n-fold composition of . We call such values of equilibria, or equivalently, xed points of . In general, may have multiple xed points that demonstrate dierent characteristics. We therefore compare the xed points of on several metrics of societal importance. (1) Stability: We say that an equilibrium ⇤ is stable if there is a non-zero measure set of initial states (0) 2 [0, 1] for which ⇤ = lim n!1 n ( (0)). In particular, if there exists a neighborhood around ⇤ such that all points converge to ⇤ under the dynamics, we say that ⇤ is locally stable. As such, stable xed points are robust to small perturbations in the qualication rate, which can occur due to random measurement errors. (2) Qualication Rate of Group a: Recall that the qualication rate, a , is the fraction of individuals in group a who invested in qualications. Since it is more desirable to have a high qualication rate in each group, we may compare equilibria based on a . We refer to G (w ) as the optimal qualication rate in group a, which is the maximum achievable qualication rate corresponding to the perfect assessment rule. 4 (3) Balance: We may be interested in equilibria where the qualication rate is similar across groups, that is, to prioritize equilibria with smaller max a 1 ,a 2 2A | ⇤ a 1 ⇤ a 2 |. When this quantity is 0 we say that ⇤ is fully balanced. (4) Institutional utility: We may compare equilibria based on their corresponding institution utility.
Examples From the Real World
Let us instantiate our model in the setting of two important applications from the real world.
College Admissions. Consider the college admission setting, where X corresponds to the features that the college can observe, e.g., a candidate's test scores and letters of recommendation. Y indicates whether the candidate meets the qualications required to succeed in the program. C is the cost of investing in the qualications, e.g., the money and opportunity cost of studying or taking additional courses to obtain the required qualications. A candidate from group a will develop features from distribution P[X = x |Y = , A = a], where = 1 indicates a qualied candidate. The dierences in the feature distribution between groups can be attributed to several factors such as resources that are available to dierent groups, e.g., letters of recommendations for qualied female and male candidates often emphasize dierent traits. is the decision parameter used by the college, e.g.,Ŷ = 1 when the candidate has SAT score of > 1400 and an excellent recommendation letter. The college accepts applicants by trading o between the utility gain, p TP , of admitting qualied candidates and utility cost, c FP , of admitting an unqualied candidates. The candidate is incentivized to acquire the qualications for the college based on the long term benet (described in Equation (1)) that depends on their expected gain w from completing a college degree and how likely it is to be admitted to college for a qualied or unqualied member of the group the candidate belongs to.
Hiring. Consider the hiring setting, where X corresponds to the features that the rm can observe, e.g., a candidate's CV. Y indicates whether the applicant meets the qualications required by the rm, e.g., having the required knowledge and the ability to work in a team. C is the cost of acquiring the qualications required by the rm, e.g., the (monetary and opportunity) cost of acquiring a college degree or working on a team project. Parameter is the hiring parameter used by the rm, e.g.,Ŷ = 1 when the applicant has a software engineering degree and two years of experience. The rm accepts candidates according to utility maximization involving p TP , the prot from hiring a qualied candidate, and c FP , the cost of hiring an unqualied candidate e.g., the loss in productivity or the the cost to replace the employee. The candidate is incentivized to acquire the qualications for the job based on factors including their expected salary w and how likely it is to be hired by the rm given how the rm has hired qualied or unqualied candidates from the group the candidate belongs to (Eq. (1)).
We also consider a stylized example of lending in Section 6.
IMPORTANCE OF (NEAR) REALIZABILITY
We start our theoretical investigation of dynamic algorithmic decision making with the classical model of realizability. In the theory of machine learning, a distribution is called realizable if there is a decision rule in the set whose error on the distribution is 0. Analogously, we call a setting realizable when there is a decision rule opt 2 that perfectly classies every individual from every group, that is TPR a ( opt ) = 1 and FPR a ( opt ) = 0 for all a 2 A. Realizability is a widely used assumption and is the basis of seminal works such as Boosting [19] . At a high level, realizability corresponds to the assumption that there is an unknown ground truth assessment rule, for example, in a hypothetical setting where x includes all the information that is sucient for assessing one's qualication, and the chosen set of decision rules is rich enough to contain it. In static realizable applications of machine learning, the goal is to (approximately) recover opt from data. We show that in the our dynamic setting, under realizability, the unique non-zero equilibrium of is where individuals respond to opt . Furthermore, each group attains their optimal qualication rate at this equilibrium. P 3.1 (P ). If there exists 2 such that TPR a ( ) = 1 and FPR a ( ) = 0 for all a 2 A, then there is a unique non-zero equilibrium with ⇤ a = G (w ) for all a 2 A.
While realizability is a common assumption in the theory of machine learning, it rarely captures the subtleties that exist in automated decision making in practice. Next, we consider a mild relaxation of realizability and consider a setting where a nearperfect decision rule 2 exists such that TPR a ( ) 1 and FPR a ( )  . As we show (and prove in Appendix A), when there is a single near-realizable group the main message of Proposition 3.1 remains eectively the same. That is, all equilibria that are reachable from initial points that are not too extreme approximately maximize the group's qualication rate.
Then for any initial investment
A nice aspect of the above results is that the assumption of realizability or near-realizability can be validated from the data. That is, the decision maker can compute whether there is 2 such that TPR( ) 1 and FPR( )  . If so, then the decision maker can rest assured that the dynamical system is on the path towards achieving near optimal investment by the individuals. Another nice aspect of these results is the characterization of the equilibria in terms of the CDF of the cost distribution. This allows us to use this framework for studying interventions that change the cost function directly. One such intervention is subsidizing the cost for individuals so that the cumulative distribution function of the cost, given by G (x ), is increased by a sucient amount at every cost level x. The following corollary, proved in Appendix B, shows that under this kind of subsidy, the equilibria reached by the dynamics will have higher qualication rate than any xed point of the dynamics before subsidy, as long as the initial points are not too extreme. As we are considering dierent cost distribution functions in the following corollary, we denote the dynamics corresponding to cost distribution function G as G . 0)).
GROUP REALIZABILITY
In this section, we investigate how the nature of equilibria evolves as the assumption of realizability is relaxed to allow for heterogeneity across groups. Specically, we consider the case where there exists a perfect assessment rule for each group, but not when the groups are combined. We call this "group-realizability". Our results illustrate that without realizability or near-realizability, the utility-maximizing assessment rule can be very sensitive to the relative qualication rates in dierent groups, resulting in multiple equilibria, at which groups may experience disparate outcomes. In sections 4.1 and 4.2, we study group-realizability under two different and complementary settings. The rst setting considers features that are drawn from a multivariate Gaussian distribution and assumes that in each group the qualied individuals are perfectly separated from unqualied ones by a group-specic hyperplane. This is a benign setting where no group is inherently disadvantaged -group features and performance of assessment rules are symmetric up to a reparameterization of the space. The second setting considers features that are uniformly distributed scalar scores and assumes that qualied and unqualied individuals in a group are separated by a group-specic threshold, where one is higher than the other. -This model captures the natural setting where the feature (score) and assessment rules inherently favor one group, e.g., SAT scores are known to be skewed by race [6] . We use the aforementioned stylized settings to demonstrate the salient characteristics of equilibria that one might anticipate under group-realizability. We nd that stable equilibria tend to favor one group or the other. This is especially surprising in the multivariate Gaussian case where the two groups are identical up to a change in the representation of the space. We also study the existence of balanced equilibria, where both groups acquire qualication at the same rate. We nd that when balanced equilibria exist they tend to be unstable, that is, no initial qualication rate (except for the balanced equilibrium itself) will converge to the balanced equilibrium under the dynamics.
We consider two natural interventions in overcoming the challenges of group-realizability as outlined above. As group-realizability poses even greater challenges when the costs of investment are unequally distributed between groups, in Section 4.3 we consider the impact of subsidizing the cost of acquiring qualication for one group. In Section 4.4, we consider the impact of decoupling, that is, we allow the institution to use dierent assessment rules for dierent groups assuming the group attributes are available. This is in contrast to the typical setting where institutions are constrained to using the same assessment rule across all groups, which may be the case when data on the protected attribute is not available or when the use of protected attributes for assessment is regulated.
Uniformly Distributed Scalar X
We consider X = [0, 1], the class of assessment paramters = [0, 1], and assessment decisionŶ h = 1{X > h} for all h 2 that represent all threshold decision policies. Consider two groups a 1 , a 2 . Let X be a score that is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] where in group a i those with score more than h i are qualied and those with score at most h i are unqualied. This is depicted in Figure 2 (right). Formally, We make the following assumption to simplify notation.
A 1. We assume n a 1 · p TP = n a 2 · c FP . We also assume that the cost for acquiring qualications is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] (i.e. G (c) = c) in both groups. 5 We show that when w is in a certain range, there are two unbalanced stable equilibria corresponding to assessment parameters h 1 or h 2 , which respectively lead to the optimal qualication rate for groups a 1 or a 2 but low qualication rate for the other group. There is also a more balanced but unstable equilibrium at some threshold h mid between h 1 and h 2 . Outside of this range of w, there is only one equilibrium in which one of the groups achieves its optimal qualication rate. These ndings are summarized in the following two propositions.
.
Note that 2 (0, h 2 h 1 ) for any w. Let w 2 (w l , w u ) where
Given Assumption 1, there exists two stable equilibria at
and a unique non-zero unstable equilibrium at
When w = 1 h 1 , the unstable equilibrium is fully balanced. The details of the proofs are presented in Appendix C. At a high level, if the wage is not too low or too high, both thresholds h 1 and h 2 correspond to stable equilibria, at which either group a 1 or a 2 is perfectly classied. The equilibrium corresponding to h mid , where the classier has the same true positive and false positive rates in both groups, is unstable and subsequently harder to achieve.
In Table 1 , we compare these equilibria in terms of metrics introduced in Section 2, under the assumptions of Proposition 4.1. We use standard notation and ⇠ to denote preference and indierence respectively. For example, we nd that in terms of balance in qualication rates, the stable equilibrium associated with h 1 is more balanced that the stable equilibrium associated with h 2 , but both are always less balanced unstable equilibrium associated with h mid . Details of the computation are deferred to 
Multivariate Gaussian X
We consider X = R d and = S d 1 , where S d 1 is the set of ddimensional unit vectors. LetŶ h = 1{X > h 0} for all h 2 denote separating hyperplane policies and \ h,h 0 B 1 arccos( h > h 0 kh k kh 0 k ) denote the angle between two vectors, normalized by the constant . We consider two groups a 1 and a 2 associated respectively with vectors h 1 and h 2 , such that \ h 1 ,h 2 , 0. We assume the groups have equal size, i.e., n a 1 = n a 2 . For each group, the feature distribution is a d-dimensional spherical Gaussian centered at the origin such that the qualied individuals are in halfspace 1{X > h i 0} and the unqualied individuals in halfspace 1{X > h i < 0}. Formally, for x 2 R d and i 2 {1, 2},
where (x ) is the density of the spherical d-dimensional Gaussian. This is depicted in Figure 2 (left).
A 2. We assume that the CDF for the cost of acquiring qualications is a strictly increasing function G : [0, 1] ! [0, 1] and is the same in both groups.
As we will see, the relative gain (loss) of the institution for accepting a qualied (unqualied) individual, that is p TP /c FP , plays a role in the nature of the equilibria. The following proposition characterizes the equilibria when this value is strictly positive, that is, when the benet of true positives outweighs the cost of false positives. Notably, similar to the previous setting of uniform scores, the current setting also has two stable equilibria that each favor one group at the expense of the other, as well as a balanced equilibrium that is unstable. 
There is a unique non-zero unstable equilibrium at
where h mid := h 1 +h 2 kh 1 +h 2 k . Let us briey comment on the high level proof idea and defer the full argument to Appendix D. Since p TP > c FP , the institution cares more about accepting true positives than avoiding false positives. Therefore, the utility-maximizing h is determined by the group that has a higher qualication rate and thus has a higher fraction of positives -this is h 1 (resp. h 2 ) whenever a 1 > a 2 (resp. a 1 < a 2 ). When qualication rates are equal between the two groups, the institution maximizes its utility at any h that is a convex combination of h 1 and h 2 , but the unique h that would induce equal qualication rate is h = h mid , where the classier has the same true positive and false positive rates in both groups.
An unfortunate implication of this result is that the dynamics will always converge to an unbalanced qualication rate, except when the initial levels of investment are exactly the same. Even though a fully balanced equilibrium exists, it is unstable and therefore not robust to small perturbations in either the qualication rates or the classier, which in practice is unavoidable given sampling noise.
In Table 2 , we compare these equilibria in terms of metrics introduced in Section 2. For example, we nd that in terms of institutional utility, the stable equilibria associated with h 1 and h 2 are equally preferred, and are both strictly preferred to the unstable equilibrium associated with h mid . This implies that the institution has no incentive at all to keep the dynamics at the unstable equilibrium, even though it induces balanced investment. Exact values are deferred to Interestingly, when p TP < c FP , there are no stable equilibria; instead there exists a stable limit cycle between h 1 and h 2 . This is stated informally in the following proposition. Intuitively, the cycle is caused by misaligned incentives between the institution and the individuals. Since the institution nds false positives more costly than false negatives, it prefers the hyperplane that classies more false positives correctly. At each time step, it will choose the hyperplane associated with the group that has a lower qualication rate, prompting that group to invest more in the next time step. Strikingly, even a simple group-realizable model involving multivariate Gaussian distributions demonstrates a large range of limiting behaviors. In Section 6, we also observe the existence of limit cycles in simulations with real data distributions.
Dierent Costs of Investment by Group
Thus far we have assumed that all groups have the same distribution of the cost of investment, G. In reality, the cost of investment may be distributed dierently in each group; a disadvantaged group might on average experience higher (monetary or opportunity) costs. For example, low income families who may have to take out loans to pay for college tuition incur high interest rates. This is a compelling setting that reects deep-seated disparities in access to opportunity between demographic groups in the real world; an analogous setting has been considered by works on strategic classication, where the costs for manipulating features is posited to dier across groups [26, 36] .
In this section, we consider the ramications of dierences in investment cost across groups, focusing on the setting of Section 4.2. We show that the disadvantage from having higher costs is amplied under group-realizability. Specically, suppose that group a 1 (resp. a 2 ) has costs distributed according to cumulative distribution function G 1 (resp. G 2 ), and that group a 1 is disadvantaged in terms of costs. The following result observes that if G 1 suciently dominates G 2 , then there exists no stable equilibrium that encourages optimal investment from group a 1 and no equilibrium that is balanced for both groups, in sharp contrast to the characterization in Proposition 4.3. The proof is deferred to Appendix E. P 4.5. Consider the multi-variate Gaussian setting of Section 4.2. Suppose G 1 and G 2 are such that G 1 (w ) < G 2 (w (1 2\ h 1 ,h 2 )), then there exists a single non-trivial equilibrium at h 2 , which is also stable. The level of investment by group a 1 (resp. a 2 ) is
Eect of subsidies. In this situation, an intervention that would eectively raise the equilibrium level of investment by the disadvantaged group is to subsidize the cost of investment. In particular, as long as we replace G 1 with a stochastically dominated distribution G 1 such thatḠ 1 > G 2 (w (1 2\ h 1 ,h 2 ) ), under the new dynamics sub , h 1 will again be a stable equilibrium, and there will also exist a more balanced, unstable equilibrium at h =h mid , which is some convex combination of h 1 and h 2 . At all equilibria of sub , group a 1 will have higher levels of investment than G 1 (w (1 2\ h 1 ,h 2 )).
However, this improvement may come at a cost to the advantaged group, since sub has multiple equilibria and some of them have group a 2 investing less than G 2 (w ). Still one might argue that the equilibria of sub are more equitable, since the dynamics without subsidies always result in optimal investment by group a 2 and low investment by group a 1 .
Decoupling the Assessment Rule by Group
The models we studied in Sections 4.2 and 4.1 suggest that applying the same, or "joint", assessment rule to heterogeneous groups results in undesirable trade-os-between balance, stability, and other metrics-at all equilibria, even though there exists a perfect assessment rule for each group separately.
Decoupling the classier by group is a natural intervention in this setting. Namely, the institution may choose a group-specic a 2 to assess individuals from group a 2 A, assuming that the group attribute information is available. This corresponds to choosing a that maximizes the utility that the institution derives from each group separately. Thus we now consider the decoupled dynamics dec where the institution uses group-specic assessment rules, i.e., for all a 2 A br a ( a ) B argmax a 2 p TP TPR a ( a ) a c FP FPR a ( a )(1 a ). 6 (5) As in the standard joint setting individuals still acquire qualication according to their group utility as follows br a ( a ) B G (w (TPR a ( a ) FPR a ( a ))). We denote by dec 2 [0, 1] |A | the equilibria of the decoupled dynamics, dec = ⇣ br a br a ⌘ a 2A
. It is not hard to see that decoupling is helpful in a group-realizable setting. That is, the qualication rates of the decoupled equilibrium dec Pareto-dominates the qualication rates of all equilibria under a joint assessment rule, whenever group-realizability holds. This proposition directly follows from Proposition 3.1. Indeed, decoupling always helps in the group-realizable settingnot only does it not decrease any group's equilibrium qualication rate, it also increases the equilibrium qualication rate of at least one group when realizability across all groups does not hold. In Sections 5 and 6 we examine decoupling in the absence of grouprealizability and see that those cases are not as clear-cut. When group-realizability does not hold, in some cases decoupling is still helpful while in others it can signicantly harm one group.
BEYOND GROUP-REALIZABILITY: MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA WITHIN GROUP
We have so far considered settings where the learning problem is realizable (or almost realizable) within each group. This is a common assumption in various prior works, such as Hu et al. [26] . As we saw in Section 4, there may be multiple undesirable equilibria when a joint assessment rule is used in a group-realizable setting, but these undesirable equilibria disappear in the decoupled dynamics. In many application domains, realizability does not hold even at a group level. That is to say, no assessment rule in can perfectly separate qualied and unqualied individuals even within one group. This may be due to the fact that mapping individuals to the visible feature space X involves loss of information or there may be other sources of stochasticity in the domain [12] , making it impossible to provide a high accuracy assessment of individuals' qualications. A key consequence of the lack of realizability is that even for a single group, the optimal classier now can vary greatly with a , the group's qualication rate. As a result, our guarantees about the near-optimality of stable equilibria (Theorem 3.2) no longer hold, and there could exist multiple stable equilibria each corresponding to a dierent qualication rate within a group. In this section, we investigate the existence of bad equilibria for a single group and its implications on decoupling when the learning problem is not group-realizable. For the rest of this section, we consider a single group, i.e., |A| = 1 and suppress a in the notation.
In the following proposition (proved in Appendix F), we characterize conditions under which multiple equilibria exists for arbitrary feature spaces and assessment rules. This is a generalization of a classical result from Coate and Loury [10] that considers a onedimensional feature space; we restate and prove the classical result as a consequence of Proposition 5.1 in Appendix F. P 5.1 (M ). Let be as dened in Section 2. For any qualication rate , let ( ) B TPR( br ( )) FPR( br ( )), be the dierence between true and false positive rates of the institution's utility maximizing assessment rule with respect to . Assume ( ) is continuous, the CDF of the cost G is continuous and that there exists 2 such that P(Ŷ = 1) = 0 and 0 2 such that P(Ŷ 0 = 1) = 1, i.e., there is a assessment rule that accepts everyone and an assessment rule that rejects everyone. Also suppose the likelihood ratio (x ) := P(X =x |Y =0) P(X =x |Y =1) is strictly positive on X. If x < G (w (x )) for some x 2 (0, 1), then there exists at least two distinct non-zero equilibria where = ( ). If in addition is dierentiable, an equilibrium at is locally stable whenever G 0 (w ( )) < | 0 ( )|, where G 0 and 0 denote the derivatives of G and respectively. Proposition 5.1 describes conditions under which there exists more than one equilibrium in the dynamics modeled in Section 2. Given a dierentiable ( ), one can always construct a monotonically increasing G, such that the dynamics has any number of locally stable equilibria. The implication of having multiple equilibria is that the dynamics may converge to dierent equilibrium qualication rates depending on the initial investment, even for a single group. This makes the setting particularly hard to analyze.
Nevertheless, the following result, proved in Appendix F, shows that even in the non-realizable setting, subsidizing the cost of investment by changing the distribution G to a stochastically dominant distributionḠ will create a new equilibrium that has a higher qualication rate. In other words, subsidies in the non-realizable setting also improve the quality of equilibria. However, the new equilibrium is not guaranteed to be locally stable. We see some ramications of this empirically in the next section. P 5.2 (S ). Suppose ⇤ > 0 is an equilibrium for the dynamics G , where the cost of investment is distributed according to G on [0, 1]. LetḠ be a CDF that is stochastically dominated by G, that is,Ḡ (x ) > G (x ) for all x 2 (0, 1), and both G andḠ are strictly increasing. Then there exists > ⇤ such that¯ is an equilibrium for Ḡ .
SIMULATIONS WITH NON-REALIZABILITY
In this section we present results from numerical experiments examining the eects of decoupling and subsidies under our model of dynamics, in the absence of group-realizability. We consider a stylized semi-synthetic experiment, based on a widely used FICO credit score dataset from a 2007 Federal Reserve report [42] . Importantly, only aggregate statistics were reported and the data we accessed does not contain sensitive or private information. Our modeling assumptions may not be realistic for this dataset (see Section 8) and our simulations should not be interpreted as policy recommendations. Instead, these experiments help us illustrate qualitatively the types of dynamics one may nd using real world data. Stylized Model. We describe how our model can be instantiated to a highly stylized example of credit scoring and lending. Assume a loan applicant either has the means to repay a loan or not. If they have the means to repay, they always repay (Y = 1); otherwise they always default (Y = 0). In order to have the means to repay, applicants must make an ex ante investment at the cost of C, whose distribution is P(C < c) = G (c). This represents costly actions an individual has to take in order to acquire the nancial ability to repay loans, e.g. working at a stable job or taking job preparation classes. Applicants from group a who have the means to repay receive credit scores X drawn from f a 1 and those who don't receive credit scores drawn from f a 0 . The decision of the bank is to approve or reject a loan applicant, given their credit scores.
Dataset. FICO scores are widely used in the United States to predict credit worthiness. The dataset, which contains aggregate statistics, is based on a sample of 301,536 TransUnion TransRisk scores from 2003 [42] and has been preprocessed by Hardt et al. [22] . These scores, corresponding to X in our model, range from 300 to 850. For simplicity, we rescale the scores so that they are between 0 and 1. Individuals were labeled as defaulted if they failed to pay a debt for at least 90 days on at least one account in the ensuing 18-24 month period. The data is also labeled by race, which is the group attribute A that we use. We compute empirical conditional feature distributions P(X = x | A = a, Y = ) from the available data and t Beta distributions 7 to these to obtain f a 0 , f a 1 . We treat these distributions as if they came from our model as shown in Figure 1 , for the sole purpose of illustration. This is not to claim that our modeling assumptions hold on this dataset, as discussed earlier. Given the lending domain is complex, our aim is not to faithfully represent this particular domain with our model, but to simulate feature distributions that exhibit group heterogeneity and non-realizability, hence extending our consideration beyond the idealized settings of Sections 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows the histograms as well as the tted Beta distributions for f a 0 , f a 1 , where a is the race attribute. It is clear that group-realizability does not hold even approximately, since there is signicant overlap in the distributions of credit scores for people who repaid and for people who did not repay.
Decoupling and Multiple Stable Equilibria
Although decoupling is guaranteed to improve the qualication rate at equilibrium over using a joint decision rule for every group (Sections 3 and 4), this is not necessarily true in the non-realizable setting. In fact, even when G is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] in all groups (i.e. the cost of investment C is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], as we considered in Section 4), decoupling did not benet all groups. As can be seen from Figure G.1 in Appendix G, while the White and Asian groups had a higher qualication rate after decoupling, the Black and Hispanic groups saw their equilibrium qualication rate decrease. On the other hand, the eects of decoupling were small in this case (less than 3 percent points dierence in the nal qualication rate).
We now show that the eect of decoupling can be drastic depending on G. Recall that in Section 5, we showed that multiple equilibria, with possibly vastly dierent qualication rates, may exist under the non-realizable setting even when there is a only single group. In general the existence of multiple equilibria depends on properties of G, that is, how the cost of investment is distributed in a group. In Figure 4 , we show the change in equilibrium investment level after decoupling for an experiment with two groups, Asian and Hispanic. The two plots each correspond to a dierent bimodal Gaussian distribution for G, truncated to [0, 1], that have been chosen such that the decoupled dynamics have multiple stable equilibria for the Hispanic (right) and the Asian (left) respectively 8 .
In both plots, we can see that the eects of decoupling depend on the initial qualication rate. If the initial qualication rate was too low, or too high, the decoupled dynamics converge to an equilibrium where one of the groups invest in qualications at a much lower level than they would under the joint dynamics. 9 8 The right (resp. left) plot is generated using a bimodal normal distribution for G with modes at 0.57 and 0.74 (resp. at 0.57 and 0.63). 9 See Figure G Figure 5 : Eects of raising the average cost of investment, by varying the mean of G on the x-axis.
Subsidizing the Cost of Investment
In this experiment, we consider if subsidizing the cost of investment of one group by changing G improves their new equilibrium qualication rate, under both decoupled and joint dynamics. Specically, we vary the cost of investment in the Black group.
We use a truncated normal distribution for G and vary its mean (on the x-axis) for a single group, while keeping the other groups' G unchanged (mean of 0.6). Figure 5 shows that subsidizing the cost of investment is eective in raising the equilibrium investment level of a group, both in the joint learning and decoupled learning case. Interestingly, large amounts of subsidy for a single group reduced the equilibrium investment levels of other groups. As also suggested by theoretical results in section 4.3, subsidizing the qualication rate of one group does sometimes entail a tradeo in the qualication rates of other possibly more advantaged groups.
Interestingly, lowering the mean cost of investment in the Black group below 0.35 caused the nal qualication rate to decrease. This is not a contradiction of Proposition 5.2, which argues that equilibria improve under subsidies but does not guarantee that the dynamics will converge to the improved equilibrium. In this case, the decoupled dynamics for the Black group (where the mean cost of investment is 0.30) actually converged to a limit cycle and the nal qualication rate in the plot is an average of the points in the limit cycle. Limit cycles are a challenging object to study in dynamical systems and game theory. While we have commented on their existence in a simple model in group-realizable setting of Section 4.2, we leave their implications in the general non-realizable setting to future work.
RELATED WORK
Our work follows a growing line of work on how machine learning algorithms interact with human actors in a dynamic setting, with the goal of understanding and mitigating disparate impact.
Recent work examine the long-term impact of group fairness criteria [see e.g., 4, Chapter 2] on automated decision making systems: Liu et al. [33] show that static fairness criteria fail to account for the delayed impact that decisions have on the welfare of disadvantaged groups. In the context of hiring, however, Hu and Chen [25] nd that applying the demographic parity constraint in a temporary labor market achieves an equitable long-term equilibrium in the permanent labor market by raising worker reputations.
Prior work on the fairness of machine learning has examined tradeos between fairness criteria [9, 32] , as well as the incompatibility between risk minimization and fairness criteria [34] , assuming that the qualication rates dier across groups. These results concern the static setting, whereas we highlight the fact that qualication rates tend to change in response to the decision rules.
Another line of work [23, 45] analyzes a dynamic model where users respond to errors made by an institution by leaving the user base uniformly at random, and demonstrate how the riskminimizing approach to machine learning can amplify representation disparity over time. This is complementary to our work which models individuals as rational decision makers who may or may not have the incentive to acquire the positive label. In particular, Hashimoto et al. [23] show that equilibria with equal user representation from all groups can be unstable, and that robust learning can stabilize such equilibria. Unlike in our model, the user representation model does not distinguish between positive and negative labels, and thus do not distinguish between false negative and false positive errors. This is a crucial distinction in high-stakes decision making as dierent error types present asymmetric incentives for individuals, as explained in Section 2; for example, a high false positive rate in hiring would encourage under-qualied job applicants.
Hu et al. [26] and Milli et al. [36] study the disparate impact of being robust towards strategic manipulation [see e.g., 21], where individuals respond to machine learning systems by manipulating their features to get a better classication. In contrast to our model ( Figure 5 ), their setting models the individual as intervening directly on their features, X , and this is assumed to have no eect on their qualication Y . This assumption applies to features that are easy to 'game' (e.g. scores on standardized tests can be improved by test preparation classes) but is less applicable to features that more directly correspond to investment in one's qualications (e.g. taking AP courses in high school). Hu et al. [26] also show that subsidizing the costs of the disadvantaged group to strategically manipulate their features can sometimes lead to harmful eects. Kleinberg and Raghavan [31] and Khajehnejad et al. [29] study decision policies that incentivize individuals to directly manipulate their features X to optimize particular notions of utility.
Our work is also related to the topic of statistical discrimination in economics [2, 3, 40] , which studies how disparate market outcomes at equilibrium can arise from imperfect information. This line of work often involves wage discrimination, whereas we assume the wage is xed and standard for all groups. Coate and Loury [10] proposed a model of rational individual investment in the labor market under a xed wage and showed that armative action may lead to an undesirable equilibrium where one group still invests sub-optimally. The model in our work is most closely related to their model, with two key distinctions: 1) We allow features X to be multi-dimensional, whereas Coate and Loury [10] assumes that X is a one-dimensional 'noisy signal'. 2) We consider the case where the conditional feature distributions, P(X = x | Y = , A = a), dier by groups whereas Coate and Loury [10] assumes that the groups are identically distributed. Under our models, if the conditional feature distributions were shared across groups, then any hiring policy will result in fully balanced equilibria where all groups have the same qualication rate and are hired at the same rate. This does not corroborate with reality, where conditional feature distributions do in fact dier across groups and we routinely observe institutions applying the same model to all individuals only to see obviously discriminatory outcomes [14] . By modeling feature heterogeneity across groups, we nd it necessarily leads to disparate equilibria.
Recently, Mouzannar et al. [37] studied the equilibria of qualication rates under a generic class of dynamics, focusing on contractive maps and the eects of armative action. In contrast, our work motivates a model of dynamics based on rational investment, and this typically leads to non-contractive dynamics. We are both interested in balanced equilibria, which they termed 'social equality'.
Finally, our work studies two interventions for nding more desirable equilibria: decoupling the classier and subsidizing the cost of investment. Several works, including Dwork et al. [17] and Ustun et al. [43] , have studied decoupled classiers in the static classication setting. Our work sheds light on when such interventions are useful in the dynamic decision making setting.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have made the following contributions:
(1) We proposed a dynamic model of decision making where individuals invest rationally based on the current assessment rule. We studied the properties of equilibria under these dynamics. (2) We showed that common properties of real data, namely heterogeneity across groups and the lack of realizability, lead to undesirable tradeos at equilibria, resulting in long term outcomes that disadvantage one or more groups. (3) We considered two interventions-decoupling and subsidizing the cost of investment-and showed that they have a signicant impact on the nature of equilibria both in theory and in numerical experiments.
We now discuss the limitations of the current work and avenues for future research. Questions related to sampling and its ramications for the nature of equilibria are challenging and warrant further study. This work assumed that the institution can estimate the true and false positive rates over the entire population, even though it really can only observe the qualication of candidates after hiring them. This is known as the selective labeling problem, which could introduce bias. In theory, unbiased estimates can be achieved by a small degree of random sampling and appropriate reweighting [see e.g., 30], but this is still a large problem in practice that requires domain-specic knowledge and solutions [15, 28] .
Our model assumed that individuals make a rational decision to invest and can aect their qualication Y directly. This assumption could be reasonable in settings like hiring, for example, where investing to acquire skills usually leads to increased competence. In some settings, however, individuals may be unable to eectively intervene on Y . For example, a business loan applicant who is a good business operator could still default on their loan due to external economic shocks or other forms of disadvantage that have not been taken into account. In this case, the current model does not fully capture the complex societal processes that lead to a positive outcome. Our work nonetheless shows that even in an idealized setting where individuals can eectively and rationally intervene on their outcome labels Y , underlying factors such as heterogeneity across groups and non-realizability already lead to undesirable tradeos at equilibrium. We leave the extensions of the current model beyond rational individual investment to future work.
